The embodied and situated nature of moods

This is the final version of the article. Available from Springer via the DOI in this record.In this paper I argue that it is misleading to regard the brain as the physical basis or “core machinery” of moods. First, empirical evidence shows that brain activity not only influences, but is in turn influenced by, physical activity taking place in other parts of the organism (such as the endocrine and immune systems). It is therefore not clear why the core machinery of moods ought to be restricted to the brain. I propose, instead, that moods should be conceived as embodied, i.e., their physical basis should be enlarged so as to comprise not just brain but also bodily processes. Second, I emphasise that moods are also situated in the world. By this I do not simply mean that moods are influenced by the world, but that they are complexly interrelated with it, in at least three different ways: they are shaped by cultural values and norms; they are materially and intersubjectively “scaffolded”; and they can even “experientially incorporate” parts of the world, i.e., include the experience of parts of the world as part of oneself

Are emotional states based in the brain? A critique of affective brainocentrism from a physiological perspective

This is the final version. Available on open access from Springer via the DOI in this recordWe call affective brainocentrism the tendency to privilege the brain over other parts of the organism when defining or explaining emotions. We distinguish two versions of this tendency. According to brain-sufficient, emotional states are entirely realized by brain processes. According to brain-master, emotional states are realized by both brain and bodily processes, but the latter are entirely driven by the brain: the brain is the master regulator of bodily processes. We argue that both these claims are problematic, and we draw on physiological accounts of stress to make our main case. These accounts illustrate the existence of complex interactions between the brain and endocrine systems, the immune system, the enteric nervous system, and even gut microbiota. We argue that, because of these complex brainbody interactions, the brain cannot be isolated and identified as the basis of stress. We also mention recent evidence suggesting that complex brain-body interactions characterize the physiology of depression and anxiety. Finally, we call for an alternative dynamical, systemic, and embodied approach to the study of the physiology of emotions that does not privilege the brain, but rather aims at understanding how mutually regulating brain and bodily processes jointly realize a variety of emotional states

Extending the extended mind: the case for extended affectivity

This is the final version of the article. Available from Springer Verlag via the DOI in this recordThere is another ORE record for this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17001The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, material artefacts can be incorporated by the thinking subject in such a way as to become a component of her extended mind. Up to this point, the focus of this approach has been on phenomena of a distinctively cognitive nature, such as states of dispositional belief, and processes of planning and calculation. In this paper, we aim to expand the scope of ExM by considering the case for extended affectivity. We begin by clarifying the central commitments of ExM, before investigating its applicability to a range of affective phenomena, both dispositional and occurrent. We argue that proponents of ExM should also accept that the vehicles of emotions, moods, sentiments, temperaments, and character traits can extend beyond skull and skin.This work has been funded by the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013), ERC grant agreement nr. 240891 (EMOTER)

What is absent from contemplative neuroscience? Rethinking limits within the study of consciousness, experience, and meditation

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Imprint Academic via the URL in this recordIn conveying experiences of meditation, the question of what exceeds or should resist description has been a recurrent topic of commentary in a wide array of literature—including religious doctrine, meditation guides (secular and religious), and contextual accounts written by historians and social scientists. Yet, to date, this question has not significantly informed neuroscientific studies on the effects of meditation on brain and behaviour, in large part—but not wholly—because of the disregard for first-person accounts of experience that still characterizes neuroscience in general. By juxtaposing perspectives from nonneuroscientific accounts on the tensions and questions raised by what is and is not expressed or expressible in words, this article paves the way for a new set of possibilities in experimental contemplative neuroscience

Conversation and behavior games in the pragmatics of dialogue

In this article we present the bases for a computational theory of the cognitive processes underlying human communication. The core of the article is devoted to the analysis of the phases in which the process of comprehension of a communicative act can be logically divided: (1) literal meaning, where the reconstruction of the mental states literally expressed by the actor takes place; (2) speaker’s meaning. where the partner reconstructs the communicative intentions of the actor; (3) communicative effect, where the partner possibly modifies his own beliefs and intentions; (4) reaction, where the intentions for the generation of the response are produced: and (5) response, where an overt response is constructed. The model appears to be compatible with relevant facts about human behavior. Our hypothesis is that, through communication, on actor tries to exploit the motivational structures of a partner so that the desired goal is generated. A second point is that social behavior requires that cooperation be maintained at some level. In the case of communication, cooperation is, in general, pursued even when the partner does not adhere to the actor’s goals, and therefore no cooperation occurs at the behavioral level. This important distinction is reflected in the two kinds of games we introduce to account for communication. The main concept implied in communication is that two agents overtly reach a situation of shared mental states. Our model deols with sharedness through two primitives: shared beliefs and communicative intentions

Emozioni come sistemi dinamici

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Società Editrice il Mulino via the DOI in this record.According to Basic Emotion Theory (BET), some emotions are innate and universal «affect programs», i.e., neural programs that, once activated, induce specific manifestations in the rest of the body (such as the face and the autonomous nervous system). Critics of this view have emphasized the variability and context-sensitivity of the emotions, arguing that BET cannot account for them. In this paper I address some of these criticisms, and argue that they do not succeed in undermining BET. I agree, however, that BET is problematic. Its main weakness, in my view, is that the empirical evidence traditionally mentioned to support it does not, in fact, do so. I think an alternative is needed -- one that can account for the shared biological features of our emotional episodes, but also for their malleability, variability, and context sensitivity. My proposal is that conceptualizing emotions as self-organizing dynamical systems provides a suitable alternative to BET that satisfies these desiderata. After introducing the main concepts of Dynamical Systems Theory, I review existing empirical and theoretical works in affective science that call for a dynamical systems approach to the emotions, illustrating its advantages and its ontological implications

Emoting the Situated Mind: A Taxonomy of Affective Material Scaffolds

This is the final version. Available on open access from Edizioni Ca’ Foscari via the DOI in this recordExisting accounts of cognitive artefacts are a useful starting point for developing the emerging notion of situated affectivity. Starting from a recent taxonomy of cognitive artefacts, I propose a taxonomy of material affective scaffolds (material objects that we use to support, shape and more generally regulate our affective states). I distinguish representational material affective scaffolds (divided into iconic, indexical and symbolic ones) from nonrepresentational ones (chemical and sensory ones). I conclude by pointing out that the resulting taxonomy is based not only on properties of objects but also on the user’s stance towards objects, which in turn depends on other contextual factors

The embodiment of emotion

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Routledge via the link in this recor

Embodied Self-Referentiality

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Johns Hopkins University Press via the DOI in this recor

Can There Be a Unified 5E Theory of Pain?

This is the final version. Available from Vrije Universiteit Brussel via the link in this recordOpen peer commentary on the article “Kaleidoscope of Pain: What and How Do You See Through It” by Maja Smrdu. Abstract: We agree with Smrdu that pain cannot be reduced to a neurophysiological event and we welcome a (micro-)phenomenological investigation of pain experience. However, we do not think such an investigation can provide sufficient support for either a 5E theory of pain, or (just) an enactive one. A 5E theory of pain would require a clarification of how the 5Es fit together. An enactive account would require a “circulation” between first- and third-person data